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A Sea Change in Security:
How the ‘War on Terror’ Strengthened Human Rights
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Abstract
In many ways the Bush administration's "war on terror" weakened states' respect for their human
rights obligations, and the UN Security Council's initial response to 9/11 seemed to follow the
Bush administration's lead. In keeping with its historical lack of engagement with human rights
questions, the SC in 2001-2003 did little to ensure that the counter-terrorism measures it
demanded of states would take their obligations under human rights and humanitarian law into
account. However, starting in 2002, a backlash against the perceived excesses wrought by the
SC’s counter-terrorism measures gained momentum. Other UN bodies, as well as NGOs,
regional intergovernmental institutions, and national and international courts increasingly
asserted that human rights and security are mutually reinforcing. The emerging norm of mutual
reinforcement gradually began to be institutionalized by the SC, which over time directed its
Counter-Terrorism Committee (established Oct., 2001) to incorporate human rights concerns
more robustly into its monitoring regime, country visits, technical assistance, and
communications. This paper analyzes three stages in the development of CTC's human rights
program: Talking, First Steps, and (perhaps) Walking. It analyzes the incorporation of human
rights into CTC’s Preliminary Implementation Assessment matrix, a document that forms the
basis of the committee’s work with individual states. It also documents the development of the
committee's joint work with other UN human rights bodies, donor states, and NGOs. CTC's
work with states is rooted in dialogue rather than sanctions, and relies on confidentiality rather
than transparency. Yet even this relatively weak form of engagement with human rights is a
rather impressive change from the past. The paper asserts that the SC's evolving approach to
counter-terrorism has bound the UN's security and human rights missions more closely together
than ever before.
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A Sea Change in Security: How the ‘War on Terror’ Strengthened Human Rights

Overview
After 9/11, the Bush administration attempted to drive a wedge between counterterrorism and human rights. The administration argued that rights like freedom of speech and
movement, due process, privacy, protection from search and seizure, and limits on detention and
interrogation made terrorists’ jobs easier. The administration brought pressure to bear on the
United Nations Security Council, essentially, to internationalize the USA PATRIOT Act.1 While
the administration’s approach was hard-line, the logic behind it was not new; in fact, the
separation between security issues and human rights issues was embedded in the structure of the
United Nations, where military questions have historically been located in the Security Council
and human rights questions in various Charter and treaty bodies. The institutional structure
reflected the notion that war and other states of emergency, like the fight against global
terrorism, are governed by one set of laws and procedures, peace and human rights by another.
Yet, in response to the global “war on terror,” this structure has come to seem
increasingly outdated, and a new norm is evolving that sees human rights and security as
inextricably intertwined. The Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, in its “Digest
of Jurisprudence of the UN and Regional Organizations on the Protection of Human Rights
While Countering Terrorism” (2003), concluded that a consensus was emerging that human
rights law and humanitarian law share a “common nucleus of non-derogable rights and common
purpose of promoting human life and dignity.”2 This is not to say that the new norm was
accepted everywhere. The creation, and especially the institutionalization, of new norms are
generally gradual and political processes, and even more so in this case because the stakes are so
high. The transformation traced here is not a completed transition and probably will not be for a
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generation. Nevertheless, this new norm has catalyzed the beginnings of change in the UN’s
institutional structure.
A month after 9/11, at the urging of the United States, the Security Council passed
Resolution 1373, drawing on its Chapter VII powers to establish a new Committee on CounterTerrorism with a sweeping mandate to ensure that states implement counter-terrorism measures.3
The resolution reinforced the separation between security and human rights: it mandated that
states cooperate with each other in the fight against terrorism but, except for one minor reference
to asylum, did not specify that in doing so they must respect their human rights obligations in
international law. This in itself might not have been so significant given that states’ obligations
to human rights are guaranteed by treaty and custom, but because the resolution presupposed an
international state of emergency, states could reasonably interpret the omission as permission to
derogate from human rights in the pursuit of suspected terrorists. And many did.
It was all the more significant because, in many commentators’ eyes, 1373 was a
watershed resolution that, for the first time, made the Security Council a “global legislator.”4 In
2002, CTC’s first chair, UK Permanent Representative to the UN Jeremy Greenstock, made the
separation explicit, asserting that human rights monitoring was “outside the scope” of CTC’s
mandate and best left to human rights organs within the UN.5 These comments support Kim
Lane Scheppele’s contention that, after 9/11, the first wave of global public law—human rights
law—gave way to a second wave of security law based on the idea of a permanent "international
state of emergency” in which, it was thought, certain human rights obligations could be ignored.6
These included the prohibition on torture and arbitrary detention, protection from nonrefoulement, due process rights, free speech, and a host of others.
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In fact, there is a good deal of evidence that the globalization of counter-terrorism law
between Oct. 2001 and early 2003 enabled executives in many states to aggrandize power and
use the proclaimed state of emergency as a pretext for passing “exception laws,” i.e., counterterrorism laws that reclassified as terrorists groups that were in fact merely political opponents or
minorities.7 Indeed, Judge Richard Goldstone and others have shown that a number of other
states—the UK, India, Russia, the Philippines, Thailand, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Liberia and
Indonesia—have already cited US behavior as precedent for exception laws restricting or
suspending human rights law for detainees.8 These developments have implications larger than
the fates of the individuals involved: the legitimacy of both international human rights and
humanitarian law is at stake. As Goldstone put it of humanitarian law, “What is of particular
concern is that this violation of international law…might well weaken the Geneva Conventions
and be used to justify similar violations by other countries.”9 Each exception law risks
contributing to the establishment of new, less restrictive state custom.10
This early situation was fluid, however. Starting in 2002, a backlash against the
perceived excesses wrought by counter-terrorism measures gained momentum. Evidence piled
up that, contrary to the notion that the easing of human rights constraints helps states prosecute
the war on terror, abuses by states are a “powerful predictor of subsequent terrorist attacks,”
especially if the rights abused involve physical integrity, like the prohibition of extrajudicial
killing, disappearances, torture, and prolonged detention.11 In late 2002, numerous actors at the
UN called for changes in CTC’s 1373 regime so that it would systematically monitor states’
compliance with their human rights obligations while countering terrorism.12 In an address to
the Security Council, Secretary-General Kofi Annan argued that “while we certainly need
vigilance to prevent acts of terrorism, and firmness in condemning and punishing them, it will be
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self-defeating if we sacrifice other key priorities — such as human rights — in the process.”
Recognizing that “the protection of human rights is not primarily the responsibility of the
Council — it belongs to other United Nations bodies, whose work the Council does not need to
duplicate,” he nonetheless maintained that “there is a need to take into account the expertise of
those bodies and to make sure that the measures the Council adopts do not unduly curtail human
rights or give others a pretext to do so.”13
In response, CTC Chair Greenstock reiterated that human rights monitoring was outside
the scope of the committee’s mandate. He expressed the concerns of many of the permanent
member states (i.e., the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia), which were committed
to fighting terrorism without being hampered by undue concern for habeas corpus, limits on
detention, and restrictions on torture and surveillance, despite that derogation from many of these
rights was prohibited under any circumstances by human rights law, humanitarian law, and
customary international law.
Nonetheless, other UN bodies joined the Secretary-General in calling for greater
coordination. The General Assembly affirmed, in a 2002 resolution by Mexico, the importance
of respecting human rights while countering terrorism.14 Mary Robinson, then the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, urged CTC to incorporate respect for human rights into its
technical assistance, and her office published a “Digest of Jurisprudence” relating to human
rights and terrorism. Sir Nigel Rodley, Vice-Chair of the Human Rights Committee (overseeing
the ICCPR), argued that CTC could not just leave human rights to treaty bodies because these
were too easily manipulated and their decisions would not carry the weight of Security Council
decisions under Chapter VII Charter provisions. Besides, he pointed out, his committee could
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only deal with 15 state reports per year.15 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees and
UNESCO also threw their weight behind the new norm.
Outside pressure was exerted by NGOs, and regional intergovernmental institutions.
Both Human Rights Watch and the European Commission for Democracy through Law issued
reports documenting the use of 1373 by states to justify human rights abuses and urged the
Commission on Human Rights to do more to prevent this.16 The International Law Commission
published its Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, urging
states to respect human rights during their responses to terrorist acts.17 The Council of Europe,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the African Union, and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe promoted the mutually enforcing nature of human rights and
counter-terrorism and limited such practices as incommunicado detention and torture.18
National, regional and international courts joined in supporting the creation of the new
norm. The OHCHR’s “Digest” cited numerous opinions by the European Court of Human
Rights, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and various national courts limiting
permissible derogations from human rights law in counter-terrorism.19 Inter-American and
African Union regional invoked the articles in their charters protecting human rights from
derogation during armed hostilities and public emergencies. The International Court of Justice,
in its advisory opinions related to Israel’s construction of a wall in the occupied territories and to
the armed conflicts in Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, reiterated the relevance of
human rights in armed conflict.20
Human rights advocates also argued that the International Criminal Court’s enabling
statute amalgamates human rights and humanitarian law in many areas, limiting derogation even
during armed conflict or states of emergency.21 Counter-terrorism officials and personnel could
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be liable for crimes against humanity under the statute if they systematically tortured suspected
terrorists, persecuted them as part of an ethnic or national group, or arbitrarily detained them.
They could be liable for war crimes—assuming the court determined that the “war on terror”
was, in fact, an armed conflict governed by its statute—for depriving suspected terrorists of
POW status, torturing detainees or subjecting them to humiliating or degrading treatment,
detaining them unlawfully, depriving them of fair trial rights and habeas corpus before a
regularly constituted court, or unlawfully deporting them. 22
This article will demonstrate that, over time, as evidence spread of an emerging
consensus that counter-terrorism and human rights are mutually reinforcing, it became routine
practice for UN actors to proclaim that a state’s human rights compliance made its counterterrorism efforts more effective, not less. These reiterations of the new norm constituted a strong
collective rebuke to the practice of those states, many of them Western powers, that had followed
the US lead.
In response to this cultural shift, the Security Council gradually gave CTC more leeway
to incorporate human rights concerns in its monitoring regime, joint work with other human
rights bodies, country visits, technical assistance, and communications. Overall, I discern three
discrete stages in the gradual development of CTC’s practice with respect to human rights
between 2003 and the present: Talking, First Steps, and (perhaps) Walking. This trajectory has
led to a rather startling new situation. While the Security Council had earlier expressed concern
for human rights in extreme circumstances (e.g., in resolutions on South African apartheid and
Soviet repression), through CTC, the Security Council, for the first time in its history, has given
to human rights the stature of a binding Chapter VII imperative.23
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The issue of human rights in counter-terrorism was the catalyst for a larger shift in
thinking about the relation between human rights and security more generally, which has had an
impact on debates about other arenas, such as sexual violence against women and children
during armed conflict, or the crackdown on free speech by dictators during the Arab Spring.24
Through its actions with respect to counter-terrorism, the Security Council has made human
rights a legitimate, ongoing object of concern in its chamber.

Stage 1 (2003-2006): Talking
Quick transformations in the observance of emerging international norms are rare
because of the complexity of multilateral negotiations, the clashing of divergent national
interests, and institutional inertia. Shifts tend to require painstakingly small steps enacted
through the most mundane institutional processes: committee meetings, work programmes,
speeches, funding requests, and the like. Where human rights in counter-terrorism is concerned,
the small steps have begun to add up to a greater movement, but in order to understand that
movement, especially where there are so many actors pursuing so many different agendas, one
must observe carefully a myriad of moving parts and establish their interrelations.
The first stage in the development of human rights awareness in counter-terrorism efforts
involved a change in the way UN actors talked about it.25 Between 2003 and 2006, across a wide
range of UN agencies, the language of official statements and resolutions moved from the
conventional wisdom that human rights and counter-terrorism are mutually exclusive to the
conclusion that they are “mutually reinforcing.”26 The first step was to insert human rights
retroactively into the mandate covered by 1373, which the Security Council did in several
resolutions between 2003 and 2005. In January, 2003, in Res. 1456, the Council for the first
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time asserted that “States must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with
all their obligations under international law,…in particular international human rights, refugee,
and humanitarian law.” This language has become routine boilerplate in every resolution since.
In this case, however, the resolution was not adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, so it did
not become part of 1373’s mandate.27
The language might have remained pro forma, but in 2004, CTC began to consider how
to incorporate human rights awareness into its practice. First, in March, the Security Council
passed Res. 1535, forming an executing authority—the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive
Directorate (CTED)—to advise CTC of how best to implement Res. 1373.28 CTED was directed
to compile information on individual states’ compliance, prepare CTC for country visits, and
provide technical assistance to states. The resolution created a new team of experts to monitor
implementation, the Assessment and Technical Assistance Office, and, significantly, established
a staff position for a senior human rights officer. The latter was the first human rights expert
ever appointed to a position in the Security Council. The new officer was tasked with
contributing information on state assessments, briefing CTED’s executive director in preparation
for state visits, helping draft reports and communications, and reporting on human rights issues
to all CTED groups.
Still, CTED’s first executive director, Javier Ruperez, remarked that “protection of
human rights cannot be construed as a priority of the CTC.”29 Only a year later, however,
CTED’s Work Program did mention this emphasis, albeit briefly and gingerly: “CTED will
advise CTC and follow its policy guidance with respect to the ways and situations in which a
human rights perspective might be appropriately incorporated into its substantive work.”30 This
is cautious bureaucratic language for “I don’t want to say this too loudly or I might lose my job.”
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The next step came as a response to the London train bombings of September, 2005. The
Security Council passed the groundbreaking Res. 1624, focusing on incitement to terrorist acts.
This resolution brought counter-terrorism and human rights closer than they had ever been. In its
preambular paragraphs, 1624 not only included the boilerplate language, but also made specific
reference to the need to protect freedom of expression and refugees and prohibit states from
repatriating refugees to countries that torture. Moreover, for the first time in a resolution, it
included an operative paragraph requiring that states respect their human rights obligations in
relation to all aspects of counter-terrorism as outlined by 1373.31 By placing this requirement in
an operative clause, the Security Council obligated states to conform their practices to their
platitudes. Finally, the resolution charged CTC to consider economic, cultural, and social rights
that were often threatened in the fight against terrorism, and the abuse of which could in fact be
conducive to terrorism. The abuses mentioned specifically included religious and ethnic
discrimination, poor economic development, and repression of civil society. In other words 1624
went beyond the established concern with civil and political rights to consider economic, social,
and cultural rights.32
Meanwhile, a wide range of other UN actors were already pressuring CTC in the area of
human rights, or would come to do so:
•

The Security Council’s Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee

•

The Secretary-General

•

The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

•

The Human Rights Council, and its Special Rapporteur on the protection and
promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism

•

Various human rights treaty bodies (ICCPR, ICESCR, CAT)
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•

The General Assembly’s United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task
Force

For example, on March 10, 2005 at the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism, and
Security in Madrid, Secretary-General Kofi Annan gave his famous “5 D’s” speech identifying
five “pillars” of what he termed a “principled, comprehensive strategy” to fight global terrorism.
The fifth “D” was to “Defend human rights in the struggle against terrorism,” recognizing that
upholding human rights is, as Annan put it, “not merely compatible with a successful counterterrorism strategy. It is an essential element of it.” He continued, “Compromising human
rights…facilitates achievement of the terrorist’s objective – by ceding him the moral high ground
and provoking tension, hatred and mistrust of government among precisely those parts of the
population where he is most likely to find recruits.”33 Annan’s speech was taken as a call for a
rigorous and consistent approach to human rights in counter-terrorism throughout the UN
system.
The General Assembly responded to this call, and on September 20, 2006, passed a
comprehensive resolution, the “United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” which
became the standard framework for all relevant actors throughout the UN system.34 The
“Strategy” articulated what had become the new conventional wisdom—that terrorism is itself
aimed at the destruction of human rights, that respect for human rights “is the fundamental basis
for the fight against terrorism,” and that security and human rights are “interlinked and mutually
reinforcing.”35 Moreover, in its Plan of Action, the GA echoed the Secretary-General in
asserting that violations of human rights create conditions “conducive to terrorism” and it called
for all UN bodies to “scale up” their cooperation and assistance to states on these issues. In
reaction against the US-led spread of exception laws, the “Strategy” called for the apprehension,
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extradition, and prosecution of terrorist suspects under the rule of human rights law.36 To show
it was serious, the General Assembly promised to strengthen its financial support to the Office of
the High Commissioner of Human Rights for increasing field operations in this area.37
The new Human Rights Council (having replaced the Human Rights Commission) acted
as well, incorporating counter-terrorism concerns in the new mechanism it created for tracking
states’ adherence to their obligations under international law: the Universal Periodic Review.38
Requiring states to report every four years, the UPR asked for states’ responses to questions
about how their counter-terrorism measures complied with specific aspects of human rights
law.39 The duplication of efforts with CTC is clear, and one could forgive states for complaining
of reporting fatigue, but the UPR process now conformed to the broader UN Strategy.40
The Security Council reacted to all the pressure from other UN and regional actors by
issuing its standard-setting Policy Guidance for CTED of May, 2006.41 The Policy Guidance
directed CTED to advise CTC as a matter of course on the human rights aspects of states’
counter-terrorism programs, as part of the ongoing dialogue with States on their implementation
of 1373. It guided CTED to provide detailed technical assistance on human rights compliance to
states, to liaise with other human rights organizations inside and outside the UN and with civil
society, and to incorporate human rights into its public communications strategy. The Policy
Guidance essentially required CTED to begin operationalizing its human rights responsibilities—
without, however, allocating any additional resources for it to do so.
One obstacle was that, by 2005, CTC had piled up a substantial backlog of reports from
states on their efforts to implement 1373. Moreover, many states were failing or did not have the
capacity to submit reports. By the end of 2005 CTC had only managed to make ten country
visits. So, to streamline the reporting process and make standards and recommendations more
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consistent, CTED in 2006 developed a new tool, the Preliminary Implementation Assessment
(PIA). Compiled from a wide range of sources, the PIA assessed, point by point, how states
responded to each requirement in the three paragraphs of 1373. As a CTED PowerPoint
presentation explained, the PIA was intended to enable CTC to:
• Make a targeted approach,
• Focus more on implementation than reporting,
• Ensure thorough, consistent, transparent and even-handed analysis for all Member States
of the United Nations,
• Use international standards,
• Allow for a longer and flexible period of time for reporting while maintaining exchanges
and dialogues with Member States, and
• Provide a basis for a global assessment of counter-terrorism efforts.42
Note that the PIA process was not backed by the threat of sanctions, and so was considered by
many human rights organizations to lack teeth. Still, this was the first time human rights
concerns were incorporated in CTED’s practical assessments, and CTED claimed it would
henceforth include human rights issues in its country visits. Progress was slow, however; by
December 2006 CTED had made only five more visits, which meant that most PIAs were
completed without the hands-on information gathered by the visiting teams through their
personal contacts with state officials, civil society members, and members of the military and
judiciary. CTED could visit only those states that agreed to host them, and could meet with only
those officials permitted to talk with them. By the end of 2006, CTED had completed only 42 of
a promised 230 PIAs. It was and remains difficult to gauge the extent to which the visits and
PIAs impacted human rights outcomes, because, as international criminal law expert George
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Andreopoulos pointed out, "only the country concerned is privy to the information included in
the PIA.”43 It is not even clear whether, at this point, the PIAs and visits raised human rights
issues at all.
In this first stage of the trajectory we there were many resolutions about implementation
and there was cross-talk and duplication among proliferating actors. The PIA process
represented embryonic but weak implementation. As E. J. Flynn, CTED’s senior human rights
officer, put it in an article reviewing this period, “the Security Council has increasingly accepted
the link between upholding human rights and humanitarian law and maintaining international
peace and security. Yet in some areas, there remain strong currents of opinion holding that the
human rights perspective should not unduly burden the Council’s agenda. This has been the case
with the Council’s work on counter-terrorism.”44

Stage 2 (November, 2007- June 2008): First Steps
In the second, relatively brief, stage, CTC and CTED began to review their efforts and
confront obstacles to states’ implementation. In December, 2007, the SC directed CTED to
reorganize its work plan in order to enact the PIA process in earnest.45 In response, CTED
created new subcommittees for reviewing PIAs consisting of three geographical clusters and five
technical groups that cut across geographical zones. The technical groups included those on
technical assistance, terrorist financing, border security, arms trafficking and law enforcement,
and last, the human rights aspects of counter-terrorism. Mike Smith, who was appointed
CTED’s executive director in November, 2007, called for a “harmonized approach to the
assessment of human rights issues across all clusters.”46 CTED also revised communications and
country visits to emphasize human rights. Due to the increased efficiencies of the new work
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plan, and with the aid of a new staff member, by the end of 2008, the CTED was able to finalize
PIAs for all states. It also began work on a “Survey of Implementation of SC Res. 1373 (2001).”
The Survey would list a number of typical human rights developments in states’ counterterrorist
activities, such as training programs for law enforcement in community policing.
The duplication of efforts among UN actors continued, but there were more efforts at
coordination. On the one hand, in July, 2008, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR) issued a fact sheet on human rights and counter-terrorism, which listed
concerns virtually identical to those identified in CTED’s Survey of Implementation, although it
did add concerns about due process, the independence of the judiciary, non-refoulement, and free
speech.47 On the other hand, Martin Scheinin, the Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur
on counter-terrorism and human rights, issued a statement in Oct. 2008 citing clear progress in
the linkages between CTC, CTED, and the HRC.48 The next month, the General Assembly
formed a Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, comprised of members of all the
relevant UN agencies with the express mission of coordinating efforts throughout the system.
The Task Force included a Working Group on Human Rights. This coordination immediately
produced something new. The Working Group undertook its first country visit to Madagascar in
2008. In a presentation to experts on counterterrorism when it returned, the Working Group’s
members argued that states’ obligations under the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, including the obligation to promote development, are crucial to the prevention of
terrorism. Indeed, they suggested “the need to reframe the notion of security to include
[development issues].”49 This meant that CTED and the Task Force had moved from focusing
merely on countering terrorism to preventing it.
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Still, obstacles continued: as of 2008, no country visits had included a representative of a
human rights body, not even the CTED’s own senior HR officer.50 How states reacted to the
PIAs and other reports and visits remained vague outside of the committee, and details were few
because the dialogue between CTC and individual states remained confidential.

Stage 3 (June 2008-present): Walking?
In the final phase, from June 2008 until the present, the UN undertook substantial efforts
to improve states’ implementation and UN actors’ coordination. On October 29, 2009, in an
address to CTC and CTED, Nevanethem Pillay, the High Commissioner for Human Rights,
provided a useful overview of developments at CTC and CTED since the issuance of the 2006
Policy Guidance, and she noted areas of remaining concern. On the plus side, she pointed out
that CTC and CTED had embraced the idea that countering terrorism while upholding human
rights “creates a climate of trust between a State apparatus and those under its jurisdiction” and
that “such trust is the very foundation of effective responses to global challenges, including
terrorism.” She noted that CTED’s human rights officer had begun to develop joint technical
assistance with her office, to act as the liaison between CTED and the Human Rights Council’s
Special Rapporteur, and to match underdeveloped states to donors engaged in capacity-building
and rule-of-law activities. She also noted that in the PIA process, CTC had been more willing to
engage in dialogue about human rights concerns, as a result of which she indicated that other UN
human rights bodies—including the treaty body monitoring compliance with the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights—had begun taking states’ reports to CTC seriously.
Nevertheless, she noted a number of concrete areas for improvement. She urged CTC to
insist that states’ definitions of terrorism-related crimes be specific, so as to avoid ex-post-facto
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law enforcement or retroactive criminalization of formerly legal activities. She warned CTC of
the negative consequences of national, ethnic, or religious profiling. CTC, she said, should insist
that states refrain from creating exceptional courts to deal with terrorism. The committee should
be vigilant in monitoring states’ restrictions on freedom of expression, in particular for civil
society organizations. It should insist on the protection of individuals’ privacy in the face of
increased intelligence-gathering. It should demand that states cease torture, ill-treatment, and
rendition of detainees. CTED should include the senior human rights officer on its country
visits, and ask states specific questions in responses to their reports about human rights
compliance.51
Evidence shows that CTC took Pillay’s recommendations to heart. In November, 2009,
CTC’s chair, Ranko Vilović, briefed the Security Council, noting that all PIAs and country visits
now raised human rights issues. The next month CTED released its broad Survey of
Implementation, which reported that “in virtually all regions there remain significant concerns
that counter-terrorism measures…do not comply with those States’ obligations under
international law.” While citing many of the same concerns that the High Commissioner had
brought to CTC’s attention, it added the continued use of extrajudicial executions, black sites,
and refoulement. Part of the problem was that states did not always grasp their responsibilities
under the norm of mutual reinforcement. A great leap forward was the publication of CTED’s
Technical Guide to the Implementation of SC Res 1373 (2001). The Technical Guide detailed
how states should fulfill their human rights responsibilities in ten concrete areas of the PIA:
•

freezing of assets

•

regulation of charities

•

criminalization of assistance
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•

suppression of recruitment

•

prevention of conducive conditions

•

use of special investigative techniques and courts

•

denial of safe haven

•

precision of the definition of terrorism-related crimes

•

pre-trial detention rules

•

and extradition/non-refoulement.

In addition, CTED published a Compilation of International Good Practices, Codes, and
Standards, which presents models for state practice based on a wide variety of UN and regional
treaties and codes, as well as INTERPOL manuals.52 Finally, CTED initiated a “stock-taking
exercise” consisting of a follow-up review of the implementation of resolution 1373 two years
after the PIA.53 The latter won praise from states for maintaining the dialogue and focusing it
on implementation. In all these ways, CTED made its interaction with states a recursive and
ongoing process.

A Parallel Case: The Sanctions Committee
The degree to which these changes reflected the will of the Security Council—and the
continuing ambivalence its members felt toward the observance of human rights in counterterrorism—can be measured by reference to parallel developments in the work of another
Security Council committee, the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee (called the
“Sanctions Committee” or “1267 Committee” after the SC resolution that created it). This
committee, created in 1999, focuses on the financing of terrorism. In the aftermath of 9/11, its
activities became a central focus of the SC’s counter-terrorism strategy. The Sanctions
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Committee began placing suspected individuals and groups on a Consolidated List that obligated
states to freeze the listed individuals’ and groups assets. An individual could be named to the list
by any state, which was not obligated to provided justification, and, apart from directly
petitioning the listing state (which was under no obligation to respond) there was no way an
individual could prove that he or she was not financing terrorism and so be removed from the
List. Because the committee targets individuals, a concern for its treatment of those individuals’
human rights grew among actors within and outside the UN. For example, the European Court
of Justice (later The Court of Justice of the European Union), in the Kadi case (2008), found that
the list preemptively punished individuals who were only suspected, but not proven, to have
financed terrorism, breaching their fair trial rights.54 Eventually, responding to numerous
complaints about this procedure, the committee appointed what it called a “focal point” to
receive delisting requests.55 There was only one problem: the focal point was permitted to
receive petitions, but it had no authority to act on them.
Moreover, it quickly became apparent that the Consolidated List was subject to abuse:
the fact that there was no way to get oneself removed from the List was apparent when it was
discovered that some of the listed individuals had died years before and yet remained on the
list.56 There was no mechanism for judicial review.57 In December 2009, the Security Council
decided to work toward greater fairness. It streamlined the delisting procedure, and, in
accordance with Res. 1904 (2009), began to publish brief “narrative summaries” of reasons for
placing individuals, groups, undertakings and entities on the List.58 The summaries are prepared
with the assistance of the committee’s Monitoring Team in coordination with the relevant
designating States. They include “the statement of the case, coversheet or any other official
information provided to the Committee, or any relevant information available publicly from
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official sources, or any other information provided by the designating State(s) or Committee
members.”59 The narratives perhaps stand in for the right of the accused to hear the charges
against him, which could provide the accused the basis for contesting the listing. However, since
this is not a court proceeding, the listed persons still have no avenue for legal appeal.
The Security Council also replaced the focal point with an Ombudsperson who is
independent of the Sanctions Committee and tasked with interacting with petitioners who make
delisting requests, as well as with relevant states and organizations. The Ombudsperson then
reports to the committee.60 In June, 2010, Judge Kimberly Prost was appointed the first
Ombudsperson. In her first press conference on July 15, 2010, Judge Prost reiterated her
intention to be independent and fair, but still noted that “Sanctions isn’t a legal committee. There
is no due process. The [listing and delisting procedures] don’t have the same measures as legal
processes.” She sees her role as addressing this issue: “There are problems with fairness,” she
said, “let’s address those through this new office.”61 By July, 2010, she had set up a stand-alone
website, public email address and simple, straightforward submission and review procedures for
petitioners seeking delisting.62 Still, it remains to be seen whether this more transparent process
will be effective, in the absence of regular judicial review. As of June, 2011, some 500 names
remained on the Consolidated List, and it should be noted that the Obama administration has
worked to weaken efforts to integrate judicial review into the process.63

Conclusion
Juxtaposing the history of the Sanctions Committee next to that of CTC, it seems evident
that, while both have moved in the direction of greater concern for human rights, CTC has
integrated this concern more thoroughly into his operations. By July, 2010, when CTC reported
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to the Security Council on its recent work, it claimed to have completely adopted the standards
outlined in the Policy Guidance and in the High Commissioner’s remarks.64 CTC’s report to the
Security Council on December 7, 2010 surveyed its human rights work as part of its three-year
funding review.65 The document asserts that human rights is raised “routinely” with states at
every level, during “country visits, workshops, videoconferences and other exchanges,” and that
CTC now works routinely with the Sanctions Committee to plan regional workshops to help
States “lacking the capacity to submit responses” as required (5).
All this is a far cry from where the committee started in 2001. Yet the big question
remains: does any of this activity produce positive outcomes for states’ observance of human
rights in counter-terrorism? Unfortunately, the answer cannot yet be assessed because
CTC/CTED’s work products—the PIAs, stock-taking exercises, records of technical assistance,
and accounts of state visits—are still not publicly accessible. Given that CTC has no recourse to
sanctions, it is unclear what follows when the committee determines that a given state could do
more to implement a particular measure. Do states file a new report in response to the PIA, and is
their report taken into account in the stock-taking exercise? The country visits are similarly
mysterious: there are no guidelines to suggest how the visiting team interacts with state officials
on these issues, what the senior human rights officer's role is, and to what extent the human
rights observations made by the visiting team are incorporated into the PIA and stock-taking
exercise. There is still no way of determining whether, in general, the process has led to
substantive corrections on human rights issues, and if so, whether there is a pattern in the types
of human rights that states have been most and least willing to address. While secrecy may in
some instances be necessary in order for states to deal in good faith on sensitive issues, it must
be balanced against the human rights requirement of transparency.
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While the committee’s proceedings are confidential, it is still possible to identify some
indirect measures of the influence of Res. 1373 on human rights. The Human Rights
Committee’s Concluding Observations in response to country reports often shed light on the
state’s compliance with human rights in counter-terrorism efforts. For example, in its 2010
Concluding Observations on Israel’s most recent country report, the Human Rights Committee
asserts that “measures designed to counter acts of terrorism, whether adopted in connection with
Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) or in the context of the ongoing armed conflict, should
be in full conformity with the Covenant.”66 The HRC goes on to suggest five concrete steps that
Israel should undertake to ensure conformity.
Similarly, in its observations on New Zealand’s report, it asserts that, “While noting the
obligations imposed under Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), the Committee expresses
concern at the compatibility of some provisions of [New Zealand’s] Terrorism Suppression
Amendment Act 2007 with the Covenant.” It also tracks New Zealand’s record with respect to
Res. 1267, recommending that the state “should take steps to ensure that the measures taken to
implement Security Council resolution 1267 (1999) as well as the national designation
procedures for terrorist groups fully comply with all the legal safeguards enshrined in article 14
of the Covenant.”67 Again, in commenting on San Marino’s counter-terrorism wire tapping law,
HRC tries to limit the scope of 1373, recommending that “the State party should ensure that its
counter-terrorism measures, whether taken in connection with Security Council resolution 1373
(2001) or otherwise, are in full conformity with the Covenant and in particular that the legislation
adopted in this context is limited to crimes that would justify being characterized as terrorist.”68
The committee often refers offending states to its General Comment No. 29 on derogation during
states of emergency.69 These are just a few of the many examples in which HRC has both
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acknowledged the compulsory nature of 1373 and attempted to limit the negative impact on
human rights. To the extent that such comments are necessary, they indirectly bear on the limits
of CTC’s human rights program. In a similar way, reactions against 1373’s procedures by
regional organizations and courts reflect a broader effort to ensure that the Security Council will
respect the norm of mutual reinforcement.70
While CTC’s evolving human rights approach is imperfect and requires the proper
qualifications and demurrals, it nonetheless reflects a sea change at the Security Council, an
evolution that cannot be restricted, in future, to the narrow field of counter-terrorism. From this
point on, it will be more difficult for a sitting member to claim that concern for human rights is
alien to the Security Council's mission. Seventy years after its establishment, the Council has, in
effect, become a human rights body. From that standpoint, the sustained international backlash
against the Bush administration's "War on Terror" strengthened human rights.
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